The article analyzes the possibility to apply de minimis exemption for agreements containing hardcore restraints. The statements are derived from analyses of scientific literature, relevant legislation, and the practice of courts and authorities responsible for competition maintenance.
INTRODUCTION
, so the assessment rules for them should be stricter.
Professor Richard Whish also agrees with colleagues about the necessity to assess such agreements in order to apply exception:
The de minimis doctrine applies both to agreements whose object and whose effect is to prevent competition, which means that even horizontal restraints of a clearly anti-competitive nature or export bans in a vertical agreements could fall outside Article 101 14 because of their diminutive impact; having said this, it is to be expected that a stricter approach will be taken to agreement in the 'object' category within Article 101(1) 15 than those that have as their effect the restriction of competition. 16 Why did the question about the assessment of agreements containing hardcore restraints arise in the first place? According the Article 101 of TFEU, such agreements are prohibited and their parties should be punished severely. The problem occurs when, based on de minimis exemption, some of the agreements can be rehabilitated as they do not have considerable effect on competition, whereas agreements containing hardcore restraints are condemned to attain strict sanctions despite their weak impact on competition. Is intervention of the 12 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, supra note 7, p. 172. 13 Richard Whish, supra note 8: 652-653. 14 Original text refers to Article 81(1) of Treaty Establishing the European Community. Currently its content is reflected in Article 101(1) TFEU. 15 Ibid. 16 Richard Whish, supra note 8, p. 138.  agreements between competitors to fix prices, limit output or share markets;
 agreements between competitors to reduce capacity;  information exchange designed to fix purchase or sale prices;  vertical restraints conferring an exclusive sales territory and protection from sales by others within the territory (absolute territorial protection or ATP) or otherwise prohibiting or limiting parallel trade; 
THE PRACTICE OF APPLYING DE MINIMIS EXEMPTION FOR AGREEMENTS CONTAINING HARDCORE RESTRAINTS
The appearance of de minimis exemption and its application allowed institutions responsible for supervising competitive situations to pay more attention to more serious problems (for example agreements between larger economic units There is no need to declare such guidance to be a separate legal act.
Corresponding provisions should find their place in the new de minimis Notice. Why create a new legal act when amendments can be adopted in a current one? The possibility to apply exception could be added to point 11 of the de minimis Notice. The latter option is more convenient because of its simpler implementation.
THE IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF AGREEMENT ASSESSMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DE MINIMIS RULE
Each agreement should be assessed individually in accordance with legal and economical criteria. During this process it is important to take into account "the content of the agreement, the objectives it seeks to attain, and the economic and legal context of which it forms part". 30 The assessment of agreement cannot end after the determination of hardcore restraints. The precise determination of the agreement's impact on competition is also important for setting sanctions for agreement's parties. In exceptional situations it can lead to application of the de minimis exemption. During the assessment process quantitative and qualitative criteria are both important. An agreement's participants' share in the relevant market has to be determined (both product and geographical market). Other criteria, such as economic and other links between the parties, are also important.
The circumstances before and after the agreement enters into force should also be assessed, as well as whether the parties' actions had significant impact on competition. The agreement's parties' importance in the relevant market is determined in several ways: mostly the turnover (sales) rates are compared with perspectives of upcoming agreement before or during the consideration process.
New provisions have the strong potential to be a tool for preventative goals.
Each agreement assessment process is based on an analysis of presently existing and possible (future) consequences. Presumptions stipulated in the de minimis Notice were based on common economic analysis. The same is to be said about the presumptions concerning the increased severity of some restraints.
Presumption is considered to be correct until it is denied. Economic analysis plays an important role in three fields: improving current regulations, analyzing individual cases and analyzing situation after intervention. However, it is not disclosed just how much narrower this should be. One thing can be stated for sure -all factors important for an individual case should be weighed.
The fact that there is no need to prove that some restraints impose restriction on competition does not contradict the possibility to apply de minimis exemption.
The latter is applicable precisely for agreements containing restraints. and 9 do not apply to agreements containing any of the following hardcore restrictions" can be changed with a new provision that agreements containing restraints listed in points 7-9 can be excused by de minimis. However, in cases of restraints by object criteria, in order to excuse, the restraints must be stricter. This is only one of the available options. Nevertheless, setting some tentative quantitative criteria for the agreement's parties' share in the market is a better way to resolve the issue.
When conducting the assessment process it is important to take into account all essential criteria. There is no doubt that in each situation they can be different. 
APPLYING DE MINIMIS FOR AGREEMENTS CONTAINING HARDCORE RESTRAINTS: EU PRACTICE
The Dutch are mentioned among the first ones whose national legal acts Council has not had access to situations where agreements containing hardcore restraints had no significant impact on competition yet.
Despite the lack of national practice, when agreements from the blacklist would be prohibited regardless of their insignificant impact on competition, current regulation requires it to be amended. The situation when legal acts do not grant the possibility to apply an exception for agreements containing hardcore restraints is temporary. National practice should change after the European Commission broadens de minimis application. Bearing in mind legal specialists' suggestions and the practice of some member states, it is safe to say that the process has already started. 
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS

